When do “proceedings” commence?

S116 of the SSAA 1992 isn’t included in Sweet and Maxwell but it sets a time limit of 12 months to commence proceedings where certain offences have been committed.

But when do “proceedings” commence? Is it at arrest or when the charging decision is made?

Many moons ago a Tribunal Chair ( many moons…) told me is was when the charging decision was made; in which case the baddies might be too late to do anything about it, depending on the charge…

Does anyone know or can you point me to resources, or can you remember the name of the court case that settled the long running mags or Tribunal issue? 

Ta

From the SS C&B Act relating to NI

(7) For the purposes of this section–
(a) proceedings in the High Court or a county court commence when an action commences; and
[(aa) civil proceedings in a magistrate’s court commence when a complaint is made;]
(b) proceedings under section 114 of the Administration Act (offences relating to contributions) commence when an information is laid.

There’s a bit in CSIS/460/2002 which says, inter alia:

“6. Did the Human Rights Act 1998 apply to the postponement decision of 12 June 2000?

This was the essential prerequisite for Mr Orr’s submissions to succeed. Mr Orr conceded in the light of various decisions by the Commissioners and the courts that the Human Rights Act 1998 in general had no retrospective effect. Thus as the Act largely came into force on 2 October 2000, it could only apply to a decision taken on 19 (sic) June 2000 if that decision was covered by Section 22(4) which gives a limited retrospective effect to the Act in certain circumstances. Essentially these are that someone who alleges an infringement of a Convention right can rely on that right in legal proceedings “brought by or at the instigation of a public authority” whenever the infringement took place. Thus the appellant can only rely on the postponement of 12 June 2000 being an infringement of her Article 6 rights if the present proceedings were “brought by or at the instigation of a public authority”. Clearly if the present proceedings are defined as being brought by the appellant and starting with her letter of appeal, they are not covered by Section 22(4). I take a broader view. I consider that in the case of an appeal relating to an overpayment of benefit, “the proceedings” commence with the taking of the decision by the Secretary of State (formerly by an adjudication officer) that there is a recoverable overpayment. In my view, such proceedings are therefore covered by Section 22(4). I hold that on general principle, it is appropriate to take a wide interpretation of the Human Rights Act given the whole context of that legislation. I further hold that the word “proceedings” can be widely defined as including more than merely proceedings before a court of (sic) a tribunal and can include earlier legal steps, particularly if they are taken by a public authority. That view is supported, in my opinion by the terms of Section 7(1) read as a whole, bearing in mind that Section 22(4) applies Section 7(1)(b) in cases which it affects. Those terms, to my mind, distinguish “any legal proceedings” and “proceedings… in the appropriate court or tribunal”. The former, appearing in Section 7(1)(b) I consider to be wider in its meaning and application than the latter, which appears in Section 7(1)(a). I also take the view that the interpretation which I have adopted is at least not excluded and indeed may well be supported by the precise terms used in Section 7(6). Thus, although proceedings before the Social Security Appeal Tribunal, and later the Appeal Tribunal, were instigated by the appellant, these, in a case like the present were part of a broader process of “legal proceedings” against the appellant which were instigated by the Secretary of State. Thus, by virtue of Section 22(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the appellant in the present case can rely on Section 7(1)(b) of that Act in respect of the postponement of 12 June 2000 although the Human Rights Act in general did not come into force until 2 October 2000.

Gareth Morgan - 25 April 2023 03:03 PM

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Thanks Gareth but these are proceedings before the mags. The (trainee) barristers in my world are leaning toward the proceedings “commenc[ing]” when a charging decision is made.

Criminal proceedings are started (at least relevantly) by serving the charge on the defendant and the court as under the ‘written charge and requisition’ procedure from s.29 Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Hi Dan,

As Section 116 is in the part of the titled “Legal Proceedings”, I have always understood it to mean that is when an information is placed before the Magistrates Court by an officer authorised under Section 116. Is that not the purpose of Paragraph 1 but to enable DWP officials (who are not solicitors or barristers) to lay an information before a JP or the Mags Court?

If DWP reported matter to the Police, the Police powers to charge a person and bring them before the Magistrates Court are not in Social Security Administration Act 1992. I also understood that the main reason for Section 116 was to alter the general time limit on bringing summary offences before the Magistrates Court.

Isn’t the case that settled the Magistrates Court v FtT question Mote v SSWP & Others?

And there you are, as usual, Elliot knows the specific answer to your question.

Best Regards

Chris