The Purposive approach

Hi

I have a tax credit Upper Tribunal appeal, involves whether a tax credit regulation should be interpreted literally or with a purposive approach.

Is anyone aware of any case law within the social security jurisdiction where a purposive approach has been taken?

I am aware of the case of Pepper v Hart, where the House of Lords used a purposive approach in interpreting tax legislation,

thanks, Jim

It is not as straight forward as either/or.  While it is true that statutory interpretation has evolved to a more purposive approach, things are a little more complex than at first sight.  Pepper v Hart was important in that it allowed materials outside of the statute to be studied as a guide to statutory interpretation, i.e. ministerial statements transcribed in Hansard, but this was only where the statute was ambiguous, irrational or would lead to situations of absurdity.  However, statute remains paramount with the judiciary keeping one eye on the intentions of Parliament, but, it is unwise to generalize.

http://home.loxfordlaw.co.uk/unit1/notes-on-statutory-interpretations

http://www.lawteacher.net/english-legal-system/lecture-notes/statutory-interpretation.php

http://www.law-essays-uk.com/resources/law-writing-help/statutory-interpretation.php

thanks,
can you mention a case where the UT has resolved an ambiguity in social security legislation using a purposive approach, in a simillar way to the method adopted by the HoL in Pepper v Hart?

Jim

There’s going to be loads but one that I always remember is CDLA/608/94 where the commissioner, at paragraph 14, said:

“It is impossible to lay down a priori rules for such questions as the distance a person must be found to walk without severe discomfort before he ceases to count as “virtually unable” to walk, since so much depends on the circumstances and physical state of each particular claimant. However it has been said that what “virtually unable to walk” means is a question of law ( R(M) 1/78 para 11), and some general guidance can be gleaned from the reported decisions. In the absence of any special indications from the other three factors, if a claimant is unable to cover more than 25 or 30 yards without suffering severe discomfort, his ability to walk is not “appreciable” or “significant”; while if the distance is more than 80 or 100 yards, he is unlikely to count as “virtually unable to walk” as those words have generally been interpreted in s.73 and reg. 12. In the difficult ground in between, I for my part find helpful the approach of the Commissioner in case CM 79/89 at para 13, where he said that mobility allowance (as it was then) was never designed to - and does not - embrace those who can walk 60 or 70 yards without severe discomfort. In such a case, therefore, there would have to be some other factor such as extreme slowness or difficulty because of the manner of moving forward on foot before a claimant would count as “virtually unable”.”

The dicta in that paragraph have since been overtaken but it is an example of a purposive approach being taken.