definition of a ‘material fact’

Has anyone seen any caselaw that defines how much of a change of circs must be disclosed in order to make it the disclosure of a material fact.

My client told DWP that they were about to get a regular payment of an occupational Pension but did not tell them how much it was when it started to be paid. I would suggest that the DWP should have/could have suspended payment of benefit, (and possibly asked for some extra info) until such time as they were satisfied that the occupational pension would not affect the benefit but they appear not to have acted on the info at all.

any opinions or case law gratefully recieved.

The lead case on the meaning of “material fact” is “Saker” - reported as R(I) 2/88.

Saker:  http://www.rightsnet.org.uk/pdfs/ri/2_88.pdf

However, there is caselaw on partial disclosure and it will depend on the facts of the case.  In CH/4043/2005, a clmt disclosed a claim for JSA had been made and the LA proceeded to assess the claim without taking JSA into account.  The Cmmr found against the clmt on the grounds that it was not an error for the LA to proceed based on the info it had and it was for the clmt to notify the LA of the subsequent award of JSA.  However, in CG/1479/1999, the Cmmr found that the DWP should have awaited the outcome of one claim for benefit before deciding another benefit that could have been affected by the first benefit.

This is one of those I wouldn’t like to bet on.  On the one hand the clmt made a “sort of disclosure”; on the other was it enough?  Could well depend on a Tribunal on the day.

Para 9166 of the DMG - “Material fact means any fact which had it been known about and properly acted upon by the Department would have prevented the overpayment in question. It is a fact which is objectively material to the decision of the Secretary of State to make an award of benefit. Whether the particular person considers it material is of no relevance”, and quotes R(IS) 7/94 as the authority.

Thanks for the replies, I will sit down with a cup of tea and read through the caselaw!

R(IS)7/94 (Also known as Sharples v CAO and Jones v CAO) develops the law as established by Saker.  It also elaborates the distinction between misrepresentation and failure to disclose.  The reporters pr-amble sums up the main issues

Held, dismissing J’s appeal (Evans LJ dissenting) and allowing S’s appeal, that:
1.  by signing the order book declaration, J had represented that he had correctly reported any facts known to him and (per Stuart Smith LJ) that was a representation as to a material fact because, unless it was true, the claimant was not entitled to any benefit and (per Dillon LJ) the representation could not be qualified by the addition of words such as “in so far as disclosure could reasonably be expected of me”;
2.  (per Evans LJ)  the declaration “I am entitled to the above sum” was a representation of law although it might include a representation of fact such as “I, the person claiming, am the person to whom the award was made or to whom the order book was sent”;
3.  (per Stuart Smith LJ)  J failed to disclose a material fact because he knew he was in receipt of unemployment benefit and must have known that it affected the amount of income support to which he was entitled;
4.  (per Stuart Smith LJ)  where the order book declaration is signed, an overpayment is recoverable by reason of either misrepresentation or failure to disclose, provided the failure to disclose is established;

5.  S’s statement that he and his partner had no life insurances or endowment policies was qualified by the form of words used in the declaration at the end of the claim form and it therefore amounted only to a representation that, as far as he knew, they had no policies, which was not a misrepresentation because he did not know of the policies possessed by his partner.