CJEU rules on standard of grounds for refusing residence card for non-EU partner

CJEU press release on Case C-89/17 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rozanne Banger -

Where an EU citizen returns to his Member State of origin, that Member State must facilitate the entry and residence of the non-EU partner with whom that citizen has a durable relationship.

A decision to refuse such a residence authorisation to the non-EU partner must be founded on an extensive examination of the applicant’s personal circumstances and be justified by reasons.

New Court of Appeal judgment considers approach to deciding residence card application by a non-EEA partner in a durable relationship with a British citizen - SSHD v Christy [2018] EWCA Civ 2378 (25 October 2018)  - in circumstances where they had no need to obtain a residence card while in the other EEA country -

‘… if the durable partner of a returning British citizen had made an application to the immigration authorities in the relationship Member State based on Article 3(2) for a residence permit there and that application had been refused, I consider that it would potentially be open to the Secretary of State to adopt a policy which said that this could be treated as a relevant, albeit not determinative, factor to be taken into account when considering an application for a residence card by that durable partner made in reliance upon the derived right of facilitation identified in the Banger case…

… however, it would not be open to the Secretary of State to adopt a policy which stipulated that the absence of a decision based on Article 3(2) of the Directive from the immigration authorities of the relationship Member State is a relevant factor to be taken into account when considering such an application for a residence card by the durable partner of a returning British citizen, where the durable partner had not made an application based on Article 3(2) because she had no need or occasion to make an application to those immigration authorities based on that provision.’ (paragraphs 48 and 49)