Does anyone have any advice on how I might tackle the refusal by JCP to allow communication with us by email regarding individual cases? When I raised this recently with Glasgow District JCP, the reply was "we do not pass customers details across electronic networks that we cannot guarantee as secure. As a result we are unable to deal with enquiries in this way as this would compromise our customer’s confidentiality."

This seems unsound to me for two main reasons. Firstly, other agencies, e.g. Housing Benefit and Disability Benefits Centres, do not have a problem communicating with us by email about clients. Secondly, I cannot see how forms of communication that JCP does accept (post and telephone) can be "guaranteed as secure."

I am also frustrated at what appears to be, in effect, a means of avoiding the inherent accountability that email communication offers.

Any advice / information / views would be most welcome.

We have had similar issues. Our policy is not to send unencrypted emails with personal details for security reasons and this works fine when communicating with most district councils but not with the DWP because their encryption software is not compatible with ours (i.e. they can't open our encrypted messages and vice versa).

Just seen the HB circular (A26/2008) on new In and Out of Work Processes (where DWP can start taking claims for HB/CTB) which talks about the need for secure email connections between LAs and DWP and looks like LAs may have to use the DWP version (Government Connect Secure Extranet). If I was a pessimist (which I am) this might mean that encrypted communication with HB departments will also be a problem in the future.

Thanks, an interesting and helpful reply. I'm particularly interested in the notion of "security" applied to emails. Most of us don't "encrypt" our otherwise encode our posted letters or faxes. And yet, when it comes to emails, we often hear expressions like "email is not a secure medium," or "email messages can be intercepted." Do you happen to know why email gets this exceptional treatment? It seems to me that a paper letter or a fax can be intercepted and read by an unauthorised person. Do you have any idea why email might be considered more vulnerable to such a breach?

It occurs to me that, if I am using email in a bona fide professional organisation, then there are measures in place that mean unauthorised interception of my email is actually less likely than interception of paper letters. For example, my network user account is password protected, and so only I can open my account and access my emails. Fairly standard practice, I believe.

Why should post be viewed as more secure than email?

I think the policy on ecryption of emails is taken at a corporate level so we have little say. We could send unencrypted emails I guess but the problem would arise if something went astray and we were then disciplined for breaching corporate IT policy.

Agree with your other points, particularly as DWP seem adept at losing confidential information in just about every format that's ever been invented.

I suppose email has the further advantage that you have the option (sometimes) of encryption.

On the wider subject of "security" concerns about email. I think this is mythology that is all too often relied on by certain authorities. In my experience it presents a serious obstacle to effective casework, particularly when mediation or complaint is required. Is it a coincidence that email offers the most effective way of tracking communication with a benefit authority re casework? Is it a coincidence that email facilitates accountability? Or am I being an irrational conspiracy theorist?

Credit where credit's due, authorities that allow email communications with customer representative agencies include DBC, Pensions Service, Carers Allowance, HB authorities (Glasgow at least), The Tribunals Service (both First-tier and Upper Tribunals) and MP constituency offices, to name but some.

I think Jobcentre Plus reliance on telephone services is a sign of an insidious creep towards the "call centre culture" that increasingly pervades many service sectors. I for one think we should fiercely resist this culture and recognise it for what it is: a barrier to effective advocacy work and a pretext for avoiding accountability. To say nothing of a lack of respect for representative agencies.

End of rant.

Snail mail goes AWOL all the time. I recently came across a tribunal decision notice that had somehow got itself delivered to a small company 50 miles away thanks to a mixup by the coursers used by the tribunals service. Fortunately they were very honest if puzzled, and sent the letter on, wondering no doubt what it was all about...

And how often do you seee pages relating to a totally different appellant pagianted into an appeal bundle?

Thank you for these comments. Needless to say I have experienced similar mishaps. Yet further examples of how bizarre it is to suggest that post is somehow more safe than email.

Hi Steven

Sending an unencrypted email is more like sending a postcard or even handing out leaflets in a shopping centre than sending a sealed letter.

There are many reasons for communicating by email, eg convenience, speed, not having to lick an envelope, but security is not necessarily one of them. If you are emailing a joke or a holiday pic then security is not a serious concern but when you are responsible for other people's personal information it should be.

Unlike in a letter, sensitive personal information in an unencrypted email is on view for millions of people all over the world to see and use. The scale of the problem is huge. Criminals work 24/7 trying to get at this information and an NI number is a crucial piece of data for them. Do not be in any doubt that there is a high premium on personal data.

With encryption, an unsecured and reckless way of communicating personal data becomes one of the safest.

Thank you for this reply and advice. I have to say I remain unconvinced that emails from a bona fide agency exchanged with a benefit authority are particularly vulnerable to the type of security breach to which you refer. However, if we can agree to differ about that for now, could you kindly give me any pointers as to how we might go about developing encrypted email exchange with certain authorities?

If its any consolation, DWP, JC+ and pension service wont communicate with local authorities via e-mail either. Pretty much all LAs have now signed up to connect to Government Connect in 2009, "a secure government network for all LAs in England and Wales. The network is called GCSx and it enables secure data sharing up to RESTRICTED level across government."

http://www.govconnect.gov.uk

Whether access will be widened to the voluntary sector i dont know

Would it be churlish to point out that the error message on the above Govconnect website does not instill one with confidence..?

There's no choice for LAs but to go down the GC (Government Connect) and GCSX route as the bits below explain. The secure email system is also tied in with this as "The counter-fraud Secure e-Mail project was abandoned when DWP decided that GC would provide the Department’s secure e-mail requirements"

Once you've decided to have secure email then it's very difficult to send or receive email from people who don't also have it, as numbers of our contacts complain regularly.

"Recent announcements from DWP on the cessation of access to DWP case data to local authorities through means other than a government approved secure IT communications channel along with the recommendations published in The Hannigan Review of Data Handling procedures in Government means that by April 2009 GCSx connection will be non-optional."

"e-Transfer Phase 1
The e-Transfer project seeks to replace paper information transfer with electronic bulk file transfer of benefit claim information gathered by Jobcentre Plus (JCP) and The Pension Service (TPS), which is required by local authorities to process HB/CTB. All phases have a dependency on GC’s bulk file transfer capability. Phase 1 will replace paper Local Authority Input Documents (LAIDs) - working age claims - with 408 bulk file transfers on a nightly basis to LAs. The files will be in the Portable Document Format (PDF) and can be scanned into LA document management systems.

Phase 1 is due to go live in November 2008.

e-Transfer Phase 2
Phase 2 will provide Extensible Markup Language (XML) files for both the LAID and TPS Local Authority Claim Information (LACI) document. This is to enable uploading directly into back office benefit processing systems, avoiding the need for scanning, indexing, or re-keying. The XML format will also enable production of pdf (readable) documents.

Phase 2 is due to go live in April 2009.

e-Transfer Phase 3
Phase 3 will provide XML and PDF files from the Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) system, concluding the range of DWP claim-gather services for local authorities.

Phase 3 is due to go live no earlier than Sep 09."

Thank you Gareth, for that comprehensive information, which led me to download the Hannigan Report. Been browsing through it, not studied it thoroughly yet. For anyone who's interested, a copy is available at: http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/65948/dhr080625.pdf

An earlier posting raised the issue of a criminal getting hold of a NI No. And of course we will all remember the media hysteria over the loss of 2 discs with child benefit records (maybe including NI numbers).

I have a question. I'm sorry if I'm being a bit thick, and probably the answer should be obvious. But I think if we focus on the actual risk it might help to gain perspective on the issue. My question is, can anyone actually spell out to me, by means of a specific example, how the obtaining of a NI No can be used to a criminal end?

ID theft isnt just about credit cards. NINO's give access to the whole Social Security Benefit system. Those who can produce fake ID's only need a real NINO in order to take advantage of the system.

Thank you for this. At last we get to the nitty gritty!

My first thought is, if production of a real NI No is sufficient to present fraudulent ID, then does the problem not lie with the practice of granting or accepting ID, rather than the sharing of NI Nos in correspondence? Would anti-fraud efforts not be better directed at whoever is accepting NI Nos as sufficient ID?

My main concern is that, restrictions on (or prevention of) the sharing of data between bona fide sources could be an over-reaction, and could cost more in terms of barriers to effective service than it saves in terms of fraud-prevention.

The proverbial baby and bath water come to mind.

Are there not more appropriate ways to restrict access to resources than barring the sharing of data? For instance, could authorities not tighten up on giving people access to resources where the only verification of identity is a few details such as NI No, date of birth etc? What about password-protection, for instance?

Just a few thoughts ...

As this government might say, "How about ID cards"?

Amusing reply, yes. But I'm sure there are less extreme alternatives to barring exchange of personal data between bona fide sources.

For example, unlike the banks I have no great concern about anyone obtaining my bank account details, as long as they don't get my PIN number or my online banking password. Access is restricted via my PIN or password, and via private security questions if I forget any of these details. Only if all these measures fail would I have to turn up at a branch and verify my ID by other means.

No restriction on my personal liberty required.

There are people, me included, who have been discussing for a long time issues around data sharing and controlling / revealing personal information.

There are theoretical ways of allowing individuals to hold personal details and reveal appropriate bits to authorised requests or send sets of information for claims or service requests.

These all need some form of trusted 3rd parties or intermediaries and that's the problem.

Who do you trust?

A benefit authority could try trusting a professional organisation with a bona fide (and verifiable) claim to be acting in the interests of the individual. I think to do otherwise can hamper delivery of effective advice and advocacy, and can therefore be detrimental to the interests of the individual it is supposed to protect.

"Trust no-one" is neither a realistic nor a fair option, I believe.

My suggestion is that there are other priorities apart from protection of personal data. There has been a tendency recently to talk of security of personal data as though it overrides all other considerations. That's my impression.

I am acutely aware of the advantages of email in terms of keeping a reliable account of the content and progress of communication with benefit authorities on behalf of a client. This is the baby that I think we should take care to avoid throwing out with the bath water.

But I'm not an IT expert. Perhaps you might try to explain to me more clearly why the risks of personal data exchange outweigh the advantages. Are there maybe statistics about criminal activity in this area that you could point me to? Or maybe specific cases you are aware of?

I've been in a meeting this morning with the head of procurement of the DWP. One of the things he said was that their overriding concern was security of information. Any failures got them on the front page of the newspapers and as the lead item on the News at 10.

You might pragmatically say that IT shouldn't be expected to be any more secure than the postal service but we've all seen the kerfuffle about missing CDs of data and lost memory sticks.

They've written to all their suppliers saying, encyrpt everything, follow our rules or get out of supplying to government.

And are we (the advice sector) all just going to lie down and take this?

Maybe some internal contact in the DWP should try "accidentally" losing some paper information and then let that get leaked to the press. Just to redress the balance.

(Only kidding of course).

From todays BBC news website:

"Hackers are believed to have stolen the personal details of millions of people using the online job site Monster.

Users around the world have been affected, including the 4.5 million users of the UK site.

If all are affected it would make it the biggest data theft in the UK since the details of 25 million child benefit claimants went missing last year. "

The problem is one of scale, or potential scale. You'd have to lose an awful lot of paper to match the data you could hold on one memory stick.

An absolutely fair and reasonable point, I accept. Certainly data on vastly greater numbers of people can be more easily obtained in electronic format than on paper.

But nevertheless this story, like others of its ilk, does smack of scare-mongering to me. Expresions like "loss of data" would imply that the details have somehow disappeared into someone else's possession.

It seems to me that the possibiliy of electronic data falling into the wrong hands is an inevitable property of the electronic data. No-one can change that.

Does it not remain the case that, advice like "do not ever give out your full password or PIN," provides the best safeguard against fraudulent use of personal data?

I just worry that access to Government will be the victim of all this hysteria. Not saying I have all the asnwers. Just wanted to start a debate.

I think we should keep a watchful eye over what other priorites are threatened by the "protection of personal data" agenda, so as to be ready to counter-argue when needed, in whatever is the appropriate policy / lobbying forum.

By way of a further example, some HB staff have been naughty; look at http://www.dwp.gov.uk/housingbenefit/user-communications/bulletins/2009/g1-2009.pdf

"Security notice – CIS access to HMRC and DWP data
6 LAs access customer information through DWP’s CIS. From July 2008 this has included access to Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC) tax credit data. Desktop access to CIS has helped to significantly improve service delivery to customers. However, DWP and HMRC customer information is shared with LAs on the understanding that only authorised access is permitted.

7 DWP’s Local Authority Support Team (LAST) carries out checks on a sample of system-generated Test Checks, which LAs have conducted. In addition, DWP and HMRC interrogate CIS to carry out independent data matches and checks of accesses made by both LA and DWP staff.

8 These checks are carried out to provide assurance to DWP and HMRC that accesses to CIS are appropriate and that information obtained is used correctly.

9 Regrettably checks have identified some LA staff are committing serious security breaches.

10 To be absolutely clear, and by way of reminder to all LA users accessing CIS, users should not

• access their own records or the records of friends, relatives, partners, or acquaintances
• make enquiries on behalf of colleagues in respect of their friends, relatives, partners, or acquaintances
• share their system, Government Gateway or other identity password with their colleagues
• access CIS for any unauthorised purpose

11 LAST will provide support to LAs conducting investigations and can provide audit trails showing the full access history of those under suspicion.

12 Anyone found to be abusing CIS may face sanctions ranging from disciplinary action to prosecution. DWP will support your LA to ensure appropriate disciplinary or prosecution action is taken, and may consider prosecuting directly under Social Security legislation."