I am working on an appeal for a profoundly deaf man who asked for a supersesssion on his DLA claim. He was awarded low rate care only after his first tribunal in 1997. This decision was reviewed by another tribunal in 1999 where it was established that, as there had been no change in circumstances or any ignorance of material facts, the decision remained unchanged.
I am trying to establish grounds for his supersession claim which was made in 2005. I have been advised that the decision made by the tribunal in 1999 is binding and that therefore any changes in circumstance need to have occured between 1999-2005. We have managed to establish that my clients communication needs have increased in this time which satisfies the care component. However, with regard to the mobility component, it is proving more difficult to find grounds.
There was an important test case decision - R(DLA) 4/01 - which could be used in favour of my client regarding low rate mobility.
What i want to know is whether it is possible to ask for the tribunal's decision in 1999 to be superseded based on the fact that there has been an important piece of caselaw established since the time of their decision.
Any knowledge on this issue is most appreciated!

CSDLA/822/2006, a recent decision by Commissioner Parker, may be worth looking at.

In brief, the commissioner holds that a tribunal's decision cannot be superseded due to an error of law and instead ignorance of a material fact or a relevant change of circumstances needs to be demonstrated.

There is a summary of CDLA/822/2006 in the briefcase area of rightsnet.

The remedy for a tribunal's decision that is wrong in law is to appeal it to a commissioner who can change it or set it aside for re-hearing, but there is an absolute time-limit of 13 months for doing this. If the decision was correct in law at the time it was made, then it would not have been appealable at that time. This is a bit like the anti-test case rules.

I don't think you need to find grounds for each component. Any material change in circumstances would be sufficient to open the award for a supersession. The only hurdle is proving the grounds exist. Once you done so, which it sounds you can, with the increase in communication needs, then the whole award can be reconsidered.

Even if this isn't right (and I haven't checked references), an increase in communication needs is, I would argue, a relevant change of circs for the lowest rate of the mobility component.

There is a big difference between finding 'no grounds for a supersession' and 'no grounds to change the award' and, although much less common that it used to be, mistakes in this area still sometimes occur. A typical example might be a decision thus: 'I found that no grounds for a supersession exist because the increase in communication needs does not give rise to an award of benefit'. The phrase 'superseeding at the same rate' was introduced to help overcome this misunderstanding, and also to ensure that claimants retained a right to appeal. From what you say, the second tribunal, and the decisions before it, might have been affected by this type of misunderstanding.

Just out of interest, what is the increase in communication needs for someone that is already profoundly deaf? Has there been a deterioration in sight or speech (both of which are relevant for low mob)?

You also need to be careful here. The law was changed to reverse one of the effects of R(DLA) 4/01 so that for the purposes of LR Mob fear or anxiety has to be as a result of a mental disablement and not deafness.

And, in passing, a change in the law can be a relevant change of circumstances for the purposes of supersession but a decision of commissioner or court is not.

I did this research some time ago see if it helps.

Social Security Act 1998

Decisions superseding earlier decisions

Section 10.


(1) Subject to <1 subsection (3)> and section 36(3) below, the following, namely-
(a) any decision of the Secretary of State under section 8 above or this section whether as originally made or as revised under section 9 above; and

(b) any decision under this chapter of an appeal tribunal of a Commissioner, may be superseded by a decision made by the Secretary of State, either on an application made for the purpose or on his own initiative.

(2) …

(3) Regulations may prescribe the case and circumstances in which, and the procedure by which, a decision may be made under this section.

(4) …

(5) Subject to subsection (6) and section 27 below, a decision under this section shall take effect as from the date on which it is made or, where applicable, the date on which the application was made.

(6) Regulations may provide that, in prescribed cases or circumstances, a decision under this section shall take effect as from such other date as may be prescribed.

The Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations 1999

Supersessions
Regulation 6

(1) Subject to the following provisions of this regulation, for the purpose of section 10, the case and circumstances in which a decision may be superseded under that section are set out in paragraph (2) to (4)

(2) A decision under section 10 may be made on the Secretary of State’s own initiative or on an application made for the purpose on the basis that the decision to be superseded-
(a,b,c, and d omitted)

(e) is a decision where-
(i) the Secretary of State has awarded a relevant benefit; and

(ii) on a date after the date that entitlement arises, the claimant or a member of his family becomes entitled to another relevant benefit or to an increase on the rate of another such benefit;

Regulation 7

(1) This regulation contains exceptions to the provisions of section 10(5) as to the date from which a decision under section 10 which supersedes an earlier decision was made, the decision under section 10 shall take effect-

(2) …
(3) …
(4) …
(5) …
(6) …

(7) A decision to which regulation 6(2)(e) applies may be made as to take effect as from the date on which the decision which has been superseded has effect, or at any time thereafter which is reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case.